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WIDOW'S RIGHT TO DOWER IN AN OIL AND GAS LEASE-
VAN CAMP v. EVANS'
In the recent case of Van Camp v. Evans' the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky held that a wife was not entitled to an assignment of
dower in her husband's interest under an oil and gas lease because
the lease did not vest in him a fee simple interest, that being one of
the statutory requirements for an assignment of dower in this state.
In addition to the words, "do hereby lease, grant and sell for the
purpose of entering upon, operating thereon, and removing there-
from oil and gas," the lease contained provisions for drilling to
begin within fifteen days, for forfeiture if the drilling conditions
were not complied with, and for an assignee to keep the lease
"alive" by drilling. There was no specified duration for the lease.
There is considerable conflict in the different states as to the
nature of oil and gas in place, and the interest conveyed to the pur-
chaser or lessee by a deed to or a lease of oil and gas rights. Some
courts hold oil and gas in place are not subject to ownership until
severed from the soil, and reduced to possession, so that the lessee
under an oil and gas lease has only a right to enter upon the land,
explore to find the oil and gas, and take the oil and gas from under
the land.' On the other hand, in Kentucky it is held that oil and gas
in place are interests in real estate, and the purchaser of oil and gas
in place acquires not only a right to go upon the property, explore,
and take the oil and gas, but also acquires the ownership of the oil
and gas itself as it lies in place on, in, or beneath the property.' The
Kentucky courts have held also that minerals are subject to owner-
ship in fee, and that the widow of the owner is entitled to dower in
the minerals.' It is interesting, therefore, to examine the court's
reasons for holding that the lease here did not pass the fee sinple
title to the oil and gas.
The decision in the principal case seems to rest on the following
grounds: The lease provided for forfeiture of the lessee's right under
the instrument by his failure to drill within the specified time, the
instrument was specifically for the purpose of entering, operating,
* This note and the succeeding one are companion notes.
'306 Ky. 59, 206 S.W 2d 38 (1947).
'Ky. R. S. (1946) 392.020.
'Alexander, Collector of Internal Revenue v. Continental
Petroleum Co., 63 F 2d 927 (C.C.A. 10th 1933), Phillips v. Spring-
field Crude Oil Co., 79 Kan. 783, 92 Pac. 1119 (1907), Frost-
Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 3.50 La. 756, 91 So. 207
(1922); Venture Oil Co. v Fretts, 152 Pa. 451, 25 Atl. 732 (1893).
'Pihe Oil and Gas Co. v. Allen, 235 Ky. 767, 32 S.W 2d 325
(1930), Trimble v Ky River Coal Corp., 235 Ky. 301, 31 S.W 2d
367 (1930).
'Pursifull's Admx. v. Pursifull, 299 Ky. 245, 184 S.W 2d 967
(1944), Trimble v. Ky. River Coal Corp., 235 Ky. 301, 31 S.W 2d
367 (1930)
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and removing the oil and gas, and the instrument provided that it
might be kept "alive" by an assignee complying with the conditions
of drilling specified in the lease. The court recognized that except
for these three features such a lease would pass the fee simple title
to the oil and gas. Since the theme of this paper is that the three
features did not render the estate passed less than a fee simple, it
may help to consider each feature separately.
THE FORFEITURE PROVISION OF THE LEASE
The lease provided for the forfeiture of the lessee's interest if
he failed to drill within fifteen days. It is difficult to see why if the
lease would pass the fee to the oil and gas, the forfeiture provision
would render the estate pissed to the lessee less than a fee. A fee
is defined as an estate with a duration potentially infinite.' Under
this lease, if the lessee complied with the drilling conditions, his
estate was potentially infinite. In effect the lease was a sale of a
portion of the land7 since the lessee had the right under the lease to
remove all of the oil and gas in place under the premises. In the
writer's opinion, the forfeiture provision of the lease was a qualifica-
tion subjoined to the fee passed by the lease. This made the interest
passed a determinable fee which is defined as a fee with a qualifica-
tion subjoined thereto, and which must be determined when such
qualification is at end. Until its determination such a fee has all the
incidents of a fee simple.' On its determination the property reverts
to the grantor without any claim or action on his part. Therefore
the forfeiture provision of the lease did not render the estate passed
less than a fee simple, but provided that the fee simple would re-
vert unless the lessee complied with the drilling conditions.
THE INSTRUMENT WAS SPECIFICALLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENTERING,
OPERATING, AND REMOVING THE OIL AND GAS
The court stressed the fact that the lease was for the purpose of
entering, operating, and removing the oil and gas. But ths provision
should not necessarily make the estate granted less than a fee. The
qualification sub3oined to a fee may be one which attaches itself to
the use of the land, so that the estate is held to be granted for that
use and purpose only.8 For instance, in the Texas case of Reynolds v.
6 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY, sec. 14 (1936)
7 Trimble v. Ky. River Coal Corp., 235 Ky. 301, 31 S.W- 2d' 367
(1930), Blakley v. Marshall, 174 Pa. 425, 34 Atl. 564 (1896), State
ex rel. Attorney General v. Hatcher, 115 Texas 332, 281 S.W. 192
(1926), Stephens County v Mid-Kansas Oil and Gas Co., 113 Texas
160, 254 S.W. 290 (1923).
'Connecticut Junior Republic Assn. v Town of Litchfield, 119
Conn. 106, 174 Atl. 304 (1934) McIntyre v Dietrich, 294 Ill. 126,
128 N.E. 321 (1920), see Rumble v Strange, 154 Ga. 512, - 114
S.E. 881, 884 (1922).
'Union Missionary Baptist Church v. Fyke, 179 Okla. 102, 64
P 2d 1203 (1937) Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil and Gas
Co., 113 Texas 160, 254 S.W 290 (1923).
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McMan Oil and Gas Co.," the lease stated " grant, convey, demise,
lease, and let for the sole and only purpose of mining and operat-
ing for oil and gas."" (Italicswriter's.) The court held that the lease
granted a determinable fee in the oil and gas. The Kentucky court
in the case of Pursifull's Adrnx. v. Pursifull- held that the widow,
of a lessee under a lease which read " for the purpose of enter-
ing upon, operating and handling and removing therefrom said oil
and gas " was entitled to dower in the lease. Although in the
Pursifull case, the court did not discuss determinable fees, it appears
that they gave the lease the effect of granting a determinable fee
as the lease contained a forfeiture clause and was for the purpose of
entering, operating, and removing the oil and gas. Several Texas
cases have held that an oil and gas lease invests the lessee with a de-
terminable fee in the oil and gas." It seems clear that where an es-
tate is conveyed in fee for a specified purpose, and no other, the fee
is a determinable fee determinable on cessation of the use of the
property for that purpose."
THE INSTRUMENT MIGHT BE KEPT "ALIVE" BY AN ASSIGNEE COMPLYING
WITH THE CONDITIONS OF DRILLING
In the principal case, the court stated that the provision that the
lease could be kept "alive" by an assignee complying with the con-
ditions of drilling was contrary to the concept of a fee simple estate.
But, is this provision contrary to the concept of a determinable fee?
The writer thinks that it is not. The owner of a determinable fee
cannot alone convey a perfect title to the property and if he conveys
in fee the determinable quality of the estate follows the transfer."
Therefore, the assignee of this lease would have to comply with the
conditions of drilling or forfeit his estate. The assignee stands in his
assignor's shoes. The determinable quality of the fee of the first
" 11 S.W 2d 778 (Tex. 1928).
"Id. at 780.
"299 Ky. 245, 184 S.W 2d 967 (1944) It is interesting to note
the extent to which the court went in rationalizing tis case with
the instant case. In the Pursifull case, 299 Ky. 245, 248, 184 S.W 2d
967, 969, the court stated: "In this state a widow is entitled to dower
in mineral leases owned by her husband." In the instant case, Van
Camp v. Evans, 306 Ky 59, 64-65, 206 S.W 2d 38, 41, they stated:
"We have reexamined the original record in that case and find that
the question involved here was not in issue.
"Sheffield v Hogg, 124 Texas 290, 77 S.W 2d 1021 (1934),
Leonard v Prater, 36 S.W 2d 216 (Tex. 1931), Morrissey v. Am-
burgey, 292 S.W 255 (Tex. 1927), see Brown v. Humble Oil and
Refining Co., 126 Texas 296, - 83 S.W 2d 935, 940 (1935).
" Slegel v. Herbine, 148 Pa. 236, 23 Atl. 996 (1892), see Regular
Predestinarian Baptist Church of Pleasant Grove v. Parker, 373
Ill. 607, -, 27 N.E. 2d 522, 524 (1940).
"Riner v Fallis, 176 Ky 575, 195 S.W 1102 (1917) Lee v.
Roberson, 297 Ill. 321, 130 N.E. 774 (1921) Blackstone v Althouse,
278 Ill. 481, 116 N.E. 154 (1917), Staack v Detterding, 182 Iowa 582,
161 N.W 44 (1917)
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owner follows any transfer by him. It follows, therefore, that the
provision is not contrary to the concept of a determinable fee.
The court did not discuss the fact that there was no term speci-
fied for the duration of the lease. As it has been held in at least one
other jurisdiction that an oil and gas lease for a term of years and
as long as oil and gas are produced in paying quantities invests the
lessee with a determinable fee,'" it seems logical that the fact that no
term was specified would be an even stronger case for holding that
the lease granted a determinable fee. If this logic is correct, the
widow of the lessee would be entitled to dower in the lease as the
courts of Kentucky have held that a widow of a person owning a
determinable fee is entitled to dower in that determinable fee.'7
In conclusion, it is suggested that the lease in the principal case
granted the fee to the oil and gas subject to forfeiture by the lessee's
failure to comply with the conditions of drilling. This seems to be
the most reasonable and logical construction of such an instrument.
Under an oil and gas lease, the lessee has the right to remove all
of the oil and gas from the land. As minerals are subject to owner-
ship in fee, it seems illogical to hold that one who has the right to
all the minerals does not own them in fee. In the writer's opinion,
the lease created a determinable fee in the oil and gas, and the
widow should have received an assignment of dower in the lease.
B. A. WELLS
"8 Leonard v. Prater, 36 S.W 2d 216 (Tex. 1931).
'- Murphy v. Murphy, 182 Ky. 731, 207 S.W 491 (1919), Landers
v. Landers, 151 Ky. 206, 151 S.W 386 (1912)- see Bodkn v. Wright,
266 Ky. 798, 799-800, 100 S.W 2d 824,825 (1937).
L. J.-6
